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PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD OF  
INTELLIGENCE

1. Intelligence, as it is known today, is a comparatively new type of activity for this country. The creation of a Central Intelligence Agency to perform functions heretofore untried by a government organization in peacetime has brought to light certain differences from other fields of endeavor. These differences have created problems in the field of Personnel Management that are unique to this organization. Perhaps some of the individual problems have arisen before in other agencies or industries, but taken as a whole the problems can not be solved by relying on previous experiences because of the uniqueness of some and the interrelationship among all the problems. This is an attempt to outline some of the more important areas that should be considered so that the Agency can grow in an orderly and mature fashion. Solving these problems will undoubtedly result in an organization that has acquired stature and can discharge its mission to the best of its ability.

2. It is well recognized that the most important asset of CIA is its personnel. Therefore, employing highly qualified persons to perform the duties and functions prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, and other appropriate legislation, becomes a major factor. CIA can not perform its complex mission without people skilled in intelligence activities. Attempting to recruit persons previously trained in intelligence, who can pass the security checks, is impossible since there is little training ground in this field outside of the intelligence community. Because of the dirth of skilled individuals, the next best solution is to employ individuals who have the native abilities to perform intelligence or related type activities. Recruitment also is hampered in this because, after ten years of CIA, the tools for measuring native abilities for performance in the intelligence field are not developed to a degree that the corolation is significant. Attempts are being made to screen prospective employees by security checks, medical checks, psychological checks, and personnel checks. Progress is being made, but the problem of selection is still in its infancy.

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3. Over the years the Agency has established a well coordinated training program to alleviate the problems of recruitment caused by our being unable to employ skilled intelligence officers. Using the best methods known in the selection process, the Agency hires individuals without prior experience and attempts to train and mold these people so that they will become highly skilled in their profession. This method of acquired competent personnel poses a problem which has not been completely resolved. Theoretically, these people undergoing training should be assessed by specific standards as soon as possible so that the incompetent or mediocre will be weeded out at an early stage. Again, because of the youthfulness of the Agency, training standards have not been firmly and sufficiently established to make this possible. The result is a great waste of time and money when an "experienced and trained" individual's performance is found to be inadequate.

4. In relationship to recruitment and training, another difficulty arises to further complicate the problem; the inability to conduct long range planning because of rapidly changing world conditions. It is not possible to stock-pile trained individuals for every emergency that might arise. Therefore, any recruitment and training that is done is based on general requirements rather than specific ones. Because of the pressures placed on this Agency for current intelligence, the opportunity to develop and cultivate individuals for long-range operations has not arisen so that the Agency could grow slowly and soundly on a firm basis.

5. Regardless of the methods used to acquire or develop skilled people, it is necessary to furnish these individuals with incentives so that they will have the desire to be initially employed by CIA, and want to continue employment on a career basis. At the present time, this Agency has the same pay scale and fringe benefits as all other government agencies with more restrictions on its employees personal lives. Because private industry and academic institutions, in many cases, offer more in the way of incentives than this Agency, CIA has difficulty in getting and holding the better qualified individuals in this highly competitive market. The only real incentive for an individual to be employed by CIA, rather than another government agency or private industry, is that he derives the feeling of furthering the fight for democracy. Since we are unable to divulge to possible candidates for employment what CIA does toward this goal, motivation generally has to come

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from the individual rather than be instilled by the recruiter. Once this individual is employed, the same problem exists because of compartmentation. The "need to know" basis on which CIA operates precludes an employee from knowing what progress is being made in the over-all Agency efforts. This might possibly have a frustrating effect on him which could cause him to look to other fields of employment. If this Agency were to establish its own pay scales and adopt a system of hazardous duty incentives and bonuses, it might be possible to attract the better candidates and keep them sufficiently motivated toward making a career with the Agency. In this connection, the problem of job security plays an important role. If individuals have a feeling of insecurity in the CIA service, little can be done in the way of extra benefits to maintain high morale. Some guarantee of permanent employment should be considered for keeping the highly skilled employees. The corollary of this which would have a tendency to impart a feeling of job insecurity is that quick methods should be used to get rid of the less than satisfactory employees. At this time, it is difficult to accurately and honestly appraise CIA employees. It is easy to measure the quantity of work done, but difficult to measure quality. One tool used is the Fitness Report, but due to the lack of seasoned supervisors and their tendency to be lenient in the preparation of this report the results are not reliable. Only after many Fitness Reports have been completed on an individual can patterns be established and recognized to determine that an individual may be performing at a low standard. By this time the mediocre individual has caused a great loss to the Agency.

6. One factor which effects the Agency in dealing with its employees, or prospective employees, is security. This effects recruitment, as mentioned above, since a prospective employee can not be told what his position will be if he is hired. In addition, if he agrees to work for CIA in spite of this, the time element in securing clearance has a detrimental effect. Many good people are lost to CIA because of the waiting time for the security check. Once an individual has passed these hurdles and is hired, security still plays a major role in his personal life and job situation. He is restricted in his home and community by being unable to talk about his work or publish in his given field. In many cases individuals are required to maintain a "cover" which is difficult under the present system of rotation. Rotating individuals from headquarters to field installations

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and returning them precludes the establishment of cover situations that can last for the tenure of employment. Therefore, the usefulness of individuals is restricted in certain types of activity. The lack of freedom and the compartmentation, both security factors, tend to impart a "lack of challenge" feeling in an employee. Because of this, young people, who have been trained and have become highly skilled in intelligence look elsewhere for employment rather than to CIA which offers them salaries at the government level for the rest of their careers. By devising a system through which an individual could realize retirement at age fifty, the Agency could have an employee motivated toward completing his career with CIA and pursuing his other endeavors afterwards at a comparatively young age. Early retirement would have another effect in keeping the Agency staffed with a young group who could perform the mission of the Agency better than an older group.

7. These are some of the problems with which CIA is faced. Solutions will have to be forthcoming if this organization is to mature to a full fledged Intelligence Agency.

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